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Shaw: Agency
AGENCY

R. BRucE Siw*
A. Authority of an Agent
The South Carolina Supreme Court, in the survey period
under consideration, had occasion to consider two cases involving
the question of the authority of an agent.
American Cas. Co. v. NiagaraFireIns. Co.1 was an action for
a declaratory judgment, brought to determine whether Niagara
Fire Insurance Company had provided liability insurance coverage for the defendant Mrs. Margaret Register. Mrs. Register
had gone to an insurance agency to obtain insurance on her 1958
Plymouth automobile. The defendant, Niagara Fire Insurance
Company, agreed to insure the car through the assigned risk
plan. Later, Mrs. Register purchased another automobile, a
Chevrolet, and asked the same agency to procure liability insurance on it. At the agency's request, Niagara issued an endorsement adding the Chevrolet to the policy insuring the Plymouth.
Subsequently, Mrs. Register sold the Chevrolet and asked the
insurance agency to cancel the applicable liability coverage. The
agency wrote Niagara requesting that the policy be cancelled
as to the Chevrolet. Upon receiving the request, however, the
company cancelled the entire policy and sent a release to the
agency where someone signed Mrs. Register's name to the release.
It was not until the unearned premium on the entire policy was
refunded that the agency realized a mistake had been made.
While the insurance agency was corresponding with the defendant insurance company trying to correct the mistake, Mrs. Register had an accident. Niagara refused to renew the policy on the
Plymouth and contended that, as a result of the execution of the
release, the policy had been effectively cancelled as to both automobiles. Mrs. Register contended that the cancellation of coverage on her 1958 Plymouth automobile was without her authorization and therefore ineffective.
The lower court held that the policy was effectively cancelled
on the basis of the execution of the release on the ground that
the insurance agency was acting as Mrs. Register's agent in the
matter and she was bound by the acts of her agent.
* Associate, Nelson, Mullins, Grier and Scarborough, Columbia, South Caro-

lina.
1. 244 S.C. 411, 137 S.E2d 412 (1964).
it
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On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that, although the agency acted as an agent of Mrs. Register
to procure the insurance coverage on her automobiles, it had
no authority to cancel her policy. The court stated: "An
agent to procure insurance is without authority to cancel it
2
unless that authority is clearly conferred."
It is generally held that an agent to procure insurance is
without authority to cancel it unless that authority is plainly
and unequivocably conferred, and such authority is not conferred
by the request of the owner of the property already insured to
keep it insured, that is, to keep the owner's property protected.3
The fact that an agent is authorized to procure insurance for
the principal does not carry with it the authority to rescind it.
Presumptively, an agent is employed to make contracts, not to
rescind or modify them, to acquire interest, not to give them up.
No power to modify or vary an agreement is to be inferred from
the general power of contracting nor has the agent any implied
4
power to give up the interest of his principal.
The court went on to find that the defendant insurance company had not relied upon the insurance agency as Mrs. Register's agent to cancel the policy, and held, on other grounds, that
the defendant Niagara Fire Insurance Company was estopped
to deny coverage to Mrs. Register.
The case of Southern Gen. Factors, Inc. v. Parker Concrete
Pile Co.5 involved the question of the authority of an agent to accept notice of an assignment. The plaintiff-assignee, Southern
General Factors, sought recovery from the defendant, R. L. Morrison & Sons, on an account of Morrison & Sons which had been
assigned to the plaintiff-assignee by the defendant Parker Concrete Pile Company. The plaintiff-assignee contended that it
had given Morrison & Sons notice of the assignment and, therefore, any payments on the account should have been made to the
plaintiff-assignee. The notice of the assignment was received
by a bookkeeper, and Morrison & Sons contended that it had no
actual notice of the assignment and that its payment to the
assignor, Parker Concrete Pile Company, was proper.
2. Id. at 418, 137 S.E.2d at 416.
3. City of New York Ins. Co. v. Jordan, 284 Fed. 420 (5th Cir. 1922) ; K. C.

Working Chem. Co. v. Eureka-Security Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 8 Cal. App.

323, 185 P.2d 832 (1947) ; Shaller v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 158 Tex.
143, 309 S.W.2d 59 (1958).
4. RESTATEMENT, AENCY § 51 (1933).
5. 236 F. Supp. 103 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
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H. W. Morrison, one of the owners of Morrison & Sons, testified that he had a bookkeeper who was in charge of the office
and the accounts. Morrison also admitted that the bookkeeper
had the authority to write letters for the company and that he
generally ran the office. Based upon this; the court held, as a
matter of law, that the bookkeeper was an agent who had authority to accept notice of the assignment and that notice to
him was notice to the defendant.
B. Scope of Employment
In Lane v. Modern Music, Inc.,6 the court was again faced
with the problem of determining whether the acts of a servant
were within the scope of his employment so as to make the employer responsible under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
The defendant owned about two hundred coin operated piccolos
and employed six or seven men to service these machines. This
service included placing the machines on location, making necessary repairs, changing the records, etc.
The testimony showed that one of the piccolos owned by the
defendant was located in a cafe in Dillon, South Carolina, and
that the plaintiff was in the cafe when two of the employees of
the defendant came in and serviced the machine. After this,
one of the employees went outside the cafe to the pick-up truck
furnished by the defendant and took a mechanism out of the
truck and placed it on the sidewalk. He then asked the owner
of the cafe to come outside and look at it. As the plaintiff left
the cafe, the employee was explaining the mechanism to the
owner and he tripped a spring which caused a fake mongoose
to jump out at the plaintiff, scaring her and causing her to fall.
The testimony also showed that the fake mongoose apparatus
belonged to the employee of the defendant and that the defendant did not know that he had such a troublesome item in his
7
possession.
Reversing the lower court and holding that a verdict should
have been directed in favor of the defendant, the court pointed
out the well-known rule that the doctrine of respondeat superior
rests upon the relation of master and servant and that a plaintiff
seeking recovery from the master for injuries must establish
that the relationship existed at the time of the injuries and the
6. 244 S.C. 299, 136 S.E.2d 713 (1964).
7. The servant was not joined in the action.
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servant was then about his master's business and acting within
the scope of his employment.
The general rule is that an act is within the scope of a servant's employment where it is reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose of his employment and is in furtherance of
the master's business.8 The act of a servant done to effect some
independent purpose of his own and not with reference to the
service in which he is employed, or while he is acting as his
own master for the time being, is not within the scope of his
employment so as to render the master liable for his actions.
When a servant is acting as his own master, he alone is liable
for injuries inflicted by his acts, and when he steps aside from
his master's business for some purpose wholly disconnected with
his employment, the relation of master and servant is temporarily suspended.9
The court found that the only duties of the servant of the
defendant were to place piccolos on location, to make necessary
repairs to them, to change the records and to collect from the
coin box the money deposited by customers. There was a complete absence of any evidence from which an inference could be
drawn that the mischievous acts of the servant had any connection with his duties concerning his master's business; therefore,
the only reasonable inference from the testimony was that the
employee used the mongoose device for his personal or private
amusement and to effect an independent purpose of his own.
The court stated that if the servant does a mischievous act
merely to frighten or perpetuate a joke on a third person, and
the act is entirely disconnected from the purpose of employment,
the master generally is not liable for the act of the servant. 10
The question of whether a sharecropper was the agent of a
landowner arose in Irick v. Ulmer. The supreme court did not
8. See, c.g, Bolin v. Bostic, 235 S.C. 319, 111 S.E2d 557 (1959), involving
an employee who injured plaintiff while the employee was on his way to work
in the morning. The court there held that an employee is not acting within the
scope of his employment while merely traveling to work. Adams v. South
Carolina Power Co., 200 S.C. 438, 21 S.E2d 17 (1942); Holder v. Haynes,
193 S.C. 176, 7 S.E.2d 833 (1940).
9. Hyde v. Southern Grocery Stores, 197 S.C. 263, 15 S.E.2d 353 (1941).
On the problem of deviation, see Carroll v. Beard-Laney, Inc., 207 S.C. 339, 35
S.E.2d 425 (1945) ; Hancock v. Aiken Mills, 180 S.C. 93, 185 S.E. 188 (1936).
10. 57 C.J.S. Master & Servant § 574(c) (1948).
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decide the question as the appellant had failed to object to the
charge as given by the trial judge.11
In United States V. Smith12 the defendants sold tobacco stored
in their warehouse on which the Farmers Home Administration
held a lien. The court found the defendants liable on the ground
that they had converted the Farmers Home Administration right
to the tobacco and stated also that liability might be imposed on
the ground that the warehousemen were agents of the mortgagor
and stood in the shoes of their principal.
C. Agent or Independent Contractor
In Kushner v. Legette'3 the plaintiff's intestate was killed
when the automobile in which he was a passenger collided with
a logging truck owned by the defendant C. M. Fullwood and
driven by Legette, his employee. The plaintiff sought to establish that Legette and Fullwood were agents of the defendant
Canal Wood Corporation. Canal owned some timber lands and
executed a pulp wood sale agreement with C. M. Fullwood who
was to pay Canal three and one-half dollars per cord for pulp
wood cut from the land. He had the right to sell the pulp wood
to anyone he chose, but usually resold the wood to Canal. During
the course of the cutting operation, Canal made advances to
Fullwood for operating expenses such as truck repairs and insurance premiums. Canal had sold two trucks to Fullwood,
including the one involved in the accident, on installment payments and kept records of the transactions between it and Fullwood.
In deciding that Fullwood and Legette were not acting as
agents, servants or employees of Canal the court quoted from the
South Carolina case of Gomillion v. Forsythe:14
An independent contractor is one who, exercising independent employment, contracts to do a piece of work accord11. 246 S.C. 178, 143 S.E2d 126 (1965). The trial judge's charge that a
sharecropper is nothing more than a laborer or servant of the landlord or
master and that the landlord could not be liable for the torts of a sharecropper
unless at the time of the delict the sharecropper was performing some act, labor
or mission at the request of or the command of the landowner, is correct under
South Carolina law as the South Carolina Supreme Court so held in Powers
v. Wheless, 193 S.C. 364, 9 S.E.2d 129 (1940).
12. 237 F. Supp. 29 (E.D.S.C. 1965).
13. 330 F2d 447 (4th Cir. 1964).
14. 218 S.C. 211, 62 S.E.2d 297 (1950).
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ing to his own methods, without being subject to the control
of his employer except as to the result of his work; an independent contractor is not a servant, and there is no master
and servant relation between his servants and the employer
for contractee. 15
Viewing the facts of the case in the light of the above quoted
South Carolina law, the court found that there was no master
and servant relationship between Fullwood and Legette and
Canal Wood Corporation. The court also found that Legette
was hired and paid by Fullwood and that Fullwood alone
instructed and supervised his employees.

15. Kushner v. Legette, 330 F.2d 447, 448 (4th Cir. 1964).
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